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INTRODUCTION

Recent welfare reform legislation replaced the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
with a largely defederalized welfare program,
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).
Benefit generosity, enforcement of program rules,
availability of training, and other aspects of TANF are
expected to vary widely across states as a result of the
defederalization. That has led to concern that some
welfare recipients will migrate to states that have more
generous programs. The concern is not a new one.
Before the legislation was passed, many questioned
whether large inter-state differences in the AFDC
benefit paid to families induced migration. This thesis
examines whether that was the case: did AFDC benefit
differentials affect individuals' location choices?
Among other things, the answer will help us better
understand how individuals may respond to variation in
welfare programs under TANF.
The results of the study also have implications for
academic research. Welfare analysts have used the
variation in AFDC benefits across states to identify its
effect on individuals' marital status, childbearing, and
labor supply choices, for example. If AFDC benefits
playa role in individuals' location choices, then the
variation in benefits across states is endogenous and
cannot be used to identify the effects of AFDC on other
decisions.
There is a substantial literature on AFDC and
migration, but unresolved theoretical and
methodological issues have led to mixed results in
studies to date. This thesis builds on the existing
literature by developing a unique theoretical framework
of decision making and by improving on two types of
estimation strategies. In a departure from the previous
literature, an individual's choice of location and choice
of whether to work and/or receive welfare are modeled
as sequential. The sequential model allows welfare
benefits to act as insurance against a bad wage outcome
in a particular location. The model yields hypotheses
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about the effect of migration in response to AFDC
benefit differentials on employment.
The theoretical model guides two estimation
strategies. The first strategy uses a "location choice"
model, in which individuals' location choices at a point
in time are analyzed, to ascertain whether in
equilibrium and holding all else constant, individuals
are distributed more heavily in higher-benefit states.
The second strategy uses a "mobility" model, in which
individuals' decisions to move from or stay in a location
are analyzed to determine whether changes in benefits
over time bring about changes in location choices over
time.
In the next section, the sequential model of decisionmaking is developed and its theoretical implications are
discussed. In Section III, two empirical strategies are
explained. Estimation results are summarized in
Section IV, and Section V is the conclusion.
THEORETICAL MODEL OF LOCATION AND
WORKIWELFARE CHOICE

The theoretical model encompasses two decisions.
Individuals choose which state to reside in and they
choose whether to work and/or receive welfare. An
individual's location decision is made by comparing the
utility of the initial location to the utility of each
alternative location in the choice set. An individual
chooses a particular location if the expected utility from
living there, less the cost of moving there, is greater
than the expected utility, net of moving costs, of each of
the other locations. An individual's work/welfare
choice is one of four alternatives: individuals can
receive welfare, neither work nor receive welfare, only
work, or do some combination of work and welfare.
Individuals also decide upon work and welfare by
maximizing utility.
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At the end of an initial time period, individuals must
choose a location and work/welfare decision for the
subsequent period. Both the choice of location and the
work/welfare choice depend in part on what wages are
in each location. Wages are determined by individual
characteristics and regional economic characteristics,
but they are also determined by a random component
which reflects a premium or discount that certain
individuals get when working for a particular employer,
which can be thought of as "luck." As a result, when
individuals are consideling different locations, they
have information about the mean wage and variance
around the wage for each location, but they do not
know the actual wage in each location. Wages are only
revealed when individuals carry out job search
activities in the chosen location. Because of the
uncertainty in wages, individuals calculate an expected
utility and expected probability of each work/welfare
alternative at the time when the location decision must
be made, but make no work/welfare decision. Thus,
each individual first chooses a location, based on an
expected work/welfare choice in each location, and
then chooses a work/welfare alternative, once the
location decision is made and calTied out.
The sequential framework allows for a direct effect
of benefits on individuals who later receive welfare and
an indirect effect of benefits on individuals who later
choose not to receive welfare. The latter may be
thought of as an insurance effect: individuals who move
to a state and later find employment may have been
affected by the insurance AFDC benefits provided
against the possibility of a poor wage draw. The
empirical implications are twofold. First, the initial
sample of individuals includes both individuals initially
observed receiving welfare and those not receiving
welfare. Both types of individuals are assumed to have
some uncertainty about future work and welfare
choices. Second, wages and benefits are allowed to
affect the location choices of both those who receive
welfare in the new location and those who work in the
new location.
The advantages of the sequential framework can be
clarified by comparing it to alternative models of
decision making. In some studies, the work/welfare
decision is not modeled at all, but rather "receipt of
welfare" is included as a right-hand-side variable. The
problem with that specification is that welfare receipt is
endogenous. Other empirical analyses have included
only those initially observed receiving welfare in the
sample popUlation. The exclusion of nonrecipients
may underestimate the true effect of AFDC benefits on
location choice. SimultaneoLls models have also been

1997 Dissertation Summaries

implemented. These models assume individuals decide
whether or not to receive welfare at the time the
location decision is made despite uncertainty about
what wages will be in different locations. The
empirical result is that benefits are allowed to affect
only those sample members who receive welfare in the
chosen location. The simultaneous framework misses
the effect of benefits on the location choices of
individuals who consider welfare but who later choose
not to receive it.
One hypothesis about the effect of migration on
employment levels is that higher AFDC benefits induce
some individuals to leave work in lower-benefit states
to join the welfare rolls in higher-benefit states,
decreasing overall employment levels. The implication
from the sequential model of location and work/welfare
choices-that benefits may act as insurance against a
poor wage draw in a location-suggests certain
modifications to that hypothesis.
Consider an individual who is deciding whether to
move from a location A where wages are relatively low
to a location B where wages are relatively high.
Individuals are likely to have better information about
the distribution of wages in the initial state A than in B
because of information-sharing networks among
neighbors, family, and friends, and because individuals
may have investigated job opportunities in the local
area in the past. Thus, the variance of wages in B is
greater than the variance of wages in A. The higher
variance in wages increases the individual's risk of a
poor wage draw in B and decreases the probability that
the individual will move to B. If benefits are relatively
high in the high-wage state B, then benefits may
facilitate migration to B by offsetting some of the risk
of a bad wage draw. On the other hand, if benefits are
relatively high in the low-wage state A, then they may
mitigate labor-market-equilibrating migration to B.
Thus, migration in response to benefits has the potential
for increasing employment levels by facilitating
movement to higher-wage states, as well as the
potential for decreasing employment levels by
impeding migration out of low-wage states. The effect
of migration in response to benefits on employment is
in part determined by the relationship between benefits
and wages across states.
ESTIMATION
Location Choice Model

Location choice studies analyze individuals' choice
of residence at a single point in time to ascertain
whether in equilibrium and holding all else constant
welfare recipients are distributed more heavily in
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higher-benefit states. Blank (1988) employs this type
of approach. She estimates a model of individuals'
choice of one of twelve regions controlling for the
characteristics of each region, including the expected
wage rate, tax rate and unemployment level, in addition
to the AFDC benefit level. Blank finds a positive effect
of benefits on location choice. Two important
methodological issues in her location choice study are
the aggregation of location choice to the regional level
and the validity of the implicit equilibrium assumption.
As a result of aggregation, the effect of AFDC benefits
on location choice is underestimated to the extent that
benefit levels affect intraregional decisions. In
addition, variation in distances between regions,
variation in wages within regions, and variation in
AFDC benefit levels within regions are not captured.
The second methodological issue concerns the implicit
assumption in the model that individuals are in
equilibrium at the point in time in which they are
observed. In Blank's analysis, there is no empirical
support for the assumption. By using cross-sectional
data, Blank observes individuals at different points in
their welfare-eligible years. Those who have received
welfare for many years are more likely to be in
equilibrium than those who have only recently become
eligible for welfare, as they may not have had a chance
to react, in terms of choosing where to live, to the
circumstance that brought about eligibility.
The first estimation strategy improves upon Blank's
location choice analysis. One improvement is
straightforward: I model an individual's choice of state
rather than the aggregated choice of region, thereby
avoiding problems of measurement error. Another
improvement stems from innovations of the theoretical
model. I allow for an insurance effect of benefits by
including benefits as regressors for all sample
members, rather than only for those who receive
welfare in the chosen location. A third improvement is
that I employ longitudinal data to empirically support
the assumption in the location choice model that
individuals are in equilibrium with respect to location.
I assume that individuals are in disequilibrium during
their first year of sample eligibility because they are not
likely to have had a chance to change location in
response to their eligibility. I then allow individuals
five years to reach equilibrium. Thus, the sample
consists of individuals' observations five years after
their initial eligible observation.

individuals' decisions to move or stay and includes as a
determinant of that choice the AFDC benefit level in the
state in which an individual is initially observed.
Zimmerman and Levine (1995) compare the migration
decisions of individuals eligible for AFDC to the
migration decisions of individuals ineligible for AFDC.
The foremost problem in these and other mobility
studies is the endogeneity of the AFDC benefit level in
the initial location-the benefit level is endogenous
because individuals have chosen the location in which
they are observed in time periods before observation.
Thus, these studies may underestimate the effect of
benefits on migration to the extent that migration in
response to benefits occurred before observation.
In a second estimation strategy, I improve upon
previous mobility studies. Two contributions are
noteworthy. First, I deal with the problem of
endogenous benefits by analyzing changes in location
as a function of changes in covariates, which are
exogenous, instead of levels, which are endogenous.
Second, I parameterize individuals' choices with a
dependent variable indicating which state the individual
chose and a lagged independent variable indicating
location in the initial time period. Previous mobility
studies have parameterized individuals' choices as the
dichotomous "move" or "stay" decision. The move/
stay decision must be estimated with either probit or
logit models, which are not able to incorporate controls
for characteristics of all alternative locations. The
model I employ can be estimated with a conditional
logit model that readily incorporates characteristics of
all locations.
The specification of right-hand-side variables in
changes requires that individuals be in equilibrium with
respect to location in the initial observation and in the
terminal observation. If individuals are in equilibrium
in their initial location, they will only react to shifts in
variables that affect the utility of each location, not the
levels of these variables. The shifts induce
disequilibrium in location, and individuals respond by
choosing a location that is optimal under the new
conditions. As in the location choice model, I support
the equilibrium assumptions with a specific sample
selection methodology involving longitudinal data. In
this model, I assume that individuals reach equilibrium
quickly, by the year following their first eligible year.
For the terminal equilibrium observation, I use each
individual's observation five years later.

Mobility Model
Studies of mobility analyze changes in individuals'
location choices between two time periods, or their
migration behavior. Clark (1990) estimates a model of
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the location choice model, I find a positive but
insignificant effect of AFDC benefits on location
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choice. Even were the hypothesis that the AFDC effect
is different from zero accepted, the practical effect of
AFDC is negligible. The magnitude of the AFDC
coefficient can be discussed in terms of its "retentive"
and "attractive" powers, the former refening to the
effect of an increase in benefits in the initial state on
staying in the initial state and the latter to the effect of
an increase in benefits in an alternative state on moving
to the alternative state. The retentive effect is smaller
than the attractive effect, but neither effect is large. A
$100 per month increase in AFDC benefits on average
increases the probability of staying in the same location
less than 1%. The retentive effect is small because the
probability of staying is large to begin with-the mean
probability of staying was 91 %. The probability of
choosing a location other than the original location
rises on average 3.8% from a $100 change inAFDC,
while for half of the sample the average effect was
more than 12.9%. But even an attractive effect of 13%
is rarely enough of an effect to evoke a move, given the
large probability of staying in the original location and
low probabilities of choosing alternative locations.
Thus, the effect of inertia is significantly stronger than
the attractive effect of AFDC. In the mobility model, I
find that changes in AFDC have a positive but
insignificant effect on location choice, and the
magnitude of the AFDC effect is comparable to that in
the location choice. A $100 increase in AFDC in a state
other than the initial state increases the probability of
choosing that location 2.6% on average.
What explains the absence of a strong positive and
significant AFDC effect? Factors that limit individuals'
ability to migrate and factors that limit migration given
an ability to migrate are at work. One of the factors that
limits mobility is liquidity constraints. Money to
finance a move may not be readily available.
Estimation results indicate that this may be the case: the
effects on the probability of choosing a location other
than the initial location of distance and number of
children, which increase the monetary cost of a move,
are negative and significant. Another monetary cost not
captured in the model is that of switching from
receiving welfare in one state to receiving welfare in
another. Bureaucratic delays may result in a lag
between receipt of the last check from the initial state
and receipt of the first check in the new state.
Liquidity-constrained individuals may not be able to
afford the time without income. Another factor that
limits mobility is the network of familial and other
support that low-income parents develop in their initial
state. The presence of non-famil y members in the
household and the proxy for familial ties in a state,
"state in which one grew up," both have large and
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significant negative effects on the probability of a
move. Others in the household and family members
may provide services which would be lost in the event
of a move. Low levels of education are also a migration
deterrent. Most AFDC eligible or nearly eligible
individuals have less than a high school education.
Even without controlling for income, mobility is
limited among less educated individuals. Education
likely increases the ability of workers to gct placed in
jobs, either because they are more employable or
because they have better information about
opportunities, leaving less educated individuals at a
disadvantage in new markets.
Why mightAFDC differentials not affect migration,
given an ability to migrate? One consideration is
information. Individuals may not know the differing
benefit levels across states. Within-community
information networks are strong, but it is not clear that
information about benefits across the nation is easily
and readily accessible. A second issue involves
multiperiod optimization and thus is not captured
explicitly in estimation of the two-period model used in
this paper. In a multiperiod model, individuals have a
longer time horizon to consider, and decisions are made
in the first time period considering the effect of that
decision on all future time periods. Thus, an individual
thinking about whether or not to move to a new location
considers the one time cost of moving compared to the
benefits of moving that extend over all future years in
which the individuals lives in the new location. The
shorter the time over which the benefits accrue, the less
likely a move will be. (Indeed, the effect of age on the
probability of migration is negative.) Consider the fact
that for many individuals the duration of AFDC
recipiency is relatively short: Blank (1989) finds a
median spell length of between 19 and 22 months,
while Ellwood (1986) notes that about 47% of new
spells last less than two years. The value of moving to
a state with higher AFDC payments will be smaller the
shorter is the time period over which individuals expect
to receive payments. Multiperiod optimization also
involves individuals' expectations about future values
of wages, benefits and the lilee. If individuals are aware
that AFDC benefits in higher-payment states have been
falling more rapidly over time than in lower-payment
states and they expect that trend to continue, then their
perceived long run value of moving for higher benefits
decreases.
CONCLUSION
Estimation of individuals' choices of location and
individuals' decisions to change location yields
consistent results. Benefit differentials across states do
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not appear to shift the equilibrium distribution of
individuals toward higher-benefit states and changes in
AFDC over time do not significantly affect individuals'
decisions to change locations,
What are the implications of the findings? Recall
that the issue is a concern in welfare research where the
variation in benefits is used to identify other incentive
effects of AFDC. The results are heartening for
academic research as they indicate that the variation in
AFDC benefits over states can be considered
exogenous at least with regard to individuals' location
decisions,
The results also help in our understanding of how
individuals are likely to react to variation in welfare
across states under TANF. Given the lack of response
in terms of migration to large AFDC benefit
differentials, we expect that migration in response to
TANF differentials will be limited, with the caveat that
individuals may react differently to variation in time
limits or work requirements than they do to differences
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monthly monetary payments. Continued research is
necessary to more fully address the issue. The models
presented here provide a useful framework for future
research on differences in TANF programs and
migration,
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